Nuclear War – Israel v Iran?

Part III – Regional Actors

Razim Rzaev

Number of Main Actors. The deep suspicions that most regional actors have about Iranian intentions might lead to further proliferation were Iran to nuclearize. Saudi Arabia (with possible help from Pakistan), Egypt, and Turkey are considered possible nuclear contenders. Multipolar “anarchical” systems (namely devoid of a central power imposing stability) would severely complicate rational decision making during nuclear crises. Territorial Contiguity. Similar to the superpowers context, Israel and Iran do not have common borders and have no direct conflicting territorial claims. This reduces to an extent the potential level of friction between the two states and the potential for direct military friction. A possible future deployment of Iranian forces in Syria as part of a defense alliance might increase the danger of direct conflict. Regime, Society, and Socialization in Nuclear Affairs. At issue is to what extent the type of regime and the degree of social coherence affect control over nuclear systems and the nature of decision making[1].

Past experience suggests that authoritarian regimes can have as effective control over nuclear systems as democratic ones. The problem with Iran regarding control, therefore, is not its lack of democracy, but the possibility of violent domestic political changes and also frictions between different regime agents regarding control of nuclear assets. Extreme ideological positions and distorted and paranoid perceptions of the adversary’s intentions might lead to irrational decisions during times of crisis. Finally, it is not clear to what extent the Iranian leadership and the high level bureaucracy in charge of defense policy have undergone a process of socialization (i.e., education) in the nuclear “facts of life.” This usually takes a long time, and – as the Indian-Pakistani crises demonstrated – opponents’ diverse interpretations of events could lead to quite different understandings of the role played by nuclear weapons[2].

It can be assumed that after almost forty years of purportedly having a nuclear capability Israel has adopted effective means of control over its nuclear systems. However, there is still a broad need for further effort to be invested in the socialization in nuclear affairs and the study of various contingencies involving nuclear affairs. Furthermore, the extreme ideological positions of Iran coupled with continued existential concerns that haunt the Israeli public and leadership might adversely affect rational decision making.

Second strike capability is an issue that has been enshrined in the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. In its absence by one side, a nuclear rival might entertain the hope of destroying completely the nuclear assets of its opponent and consequently expose it to unlimited military and political demands. At the same time, the party lacking second strike capability might be tempted to strike first, in the hope that it would at least curtail the expected damage that might be caused by the inevitable first strike by its adversary. Thus, theoretically, for the balance to be stable both sides need a second strike capability. Under conditions of uncertainty about the second strike assets of both sides, mutual anxieties might lead to first strikes. At the sametime, there is no need to emulate the superpowers model exactly for a regional nuclear balance to be stable[3].

The classic triad of strategic forces with all its components is not essential. Rather, what is surely necessary is that each side has sufficient known or assumed capabilities to create a significant measure of certainty by its adversary that it has the capability to strike back and thus cause unacceptable damage to the other side. Conditions for accomplishing this vary from one context to the other. In the Israeli-Iranian case, unacceptable damage would mean a high level of destruction to the main urban centers and especially to the centers of government and the command and control facilities. There is possibly an asymmetry between Iran and Israel in regard to the effect of second strike capabilities. In view of repeated declarations by Iranian leaders that Israel should disappear from the map, versus the complete absence of interest on the part of Israel in causing devastating damage to Iran and its people per se, the need for an Israeli second strike capability is more emphasized for mutual deterrence stability[4]. The absence of an Iranian second strike capability would not therefore “invite” an Israeli first strike per se.

The mutual images the parties have of second strike capabilities would be based on some calculations, be they even crude, about the survivability of the rival’s nuclear systems. Israel maintains a veil of ambiguity over all its nuclear capabilities, but international sources have suggested that it has a large arsenal of warheads (60-80, according to one American official estimate, up to 200 according to the IISS, and more according to other possibly less reliable sources)[5]. In addition, it has been widely suggested by foreign sources that Israel’s warheads are carried by both aircraft and missiles, with sufficient ranges to hit Iran. Both the airports and the missile silos are presumed to be hardened. Thus, it can be assumed that no rational decision maker would doubt the Israeli capability to strike back at Iran if the latter decided to launch a counter force first strike.

In the Israeli-Iranian context, the dangers of early warning failures are much higher than was the case in the superpower context. First, because of the short distances, the warning lead time is much shorter, and therefore the scope for mistakes is wider. This might be even worse were Iranian nuclear missiles or aircraft to be deployed in areas nearer to Israel. Second, while Israeli early warning systems are developed and sophisticated, this cannot be said about the Iranian counterparts. Third, since additional actors might be involved in an Israeli-Iranian crisis, the ability of early warning systems to carefully detect and differentiate incoming flights or missile launches from the outside would be much more complicated than was the case in the superpowers context[6].

Fourth, it would be virtually impossible to determine what kinds of armaments are carried by incoming aircraft or missiles: conventional, biological, chemical, or nuclear. Different munitions, however, require different responses. These points relate primarily to the technical dimension of early warning systems. Equally important is the ability of decision makers to make rational decisions upon receiving early warning signals. Misperceptions about the intentions of nuclear adversaries could easily lead to disastrous consequences. Thus, for example, the image of Israel as the “small Satan” An Israel-Iran Balance of Nuclear Deterrence: Seeds of Instability  that is invoked regularly among the current Iranian leaders might lead to mistaken conclusions about Israeli military steps[7].

Any early warning of incoming flights from the assumed direction of Israel might be construed as an Israeli nuclear attack, or alternatively of a conventional attack designed to neutralize Iran’s nuclear capability. It is likely that the conceptual background of Israeli decision makers would be at least partly affected by images of Iran’s presumed desire to destroy Israel. This might provoke an Israeli decision to launch a preemptive counterforce nuclear strike against Iran if there are signals that an Iranian first strike is imminent. Extremely short time spans for making such decisions and the possible built-in technical problems involved in any early warning system coupled with the relatively short distances involved might cause very significant difficulties for rational and cautious decision making.

---

[1] STEIN, Kenneth, SICK, Gary , LEVY, Daniel, and MENASHRI, David (2009) Sh’ma: A Journal of Jewish Responsibility — Iran, Israel, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Iran, Israel and U.S. Foreign Policy) Kindle Edition p. 45.

[2] Ibid.

[3] GILDER, George (2009) The Israel Test Richard Vigilante Books 1^st edition p. 121.

[4] Ibid, p. 122.

[5] ITAR-TASS The Military Balance (2007) Iran celebrating day of nuke technology.

[6] http://www.iiss.org/publications/adelphi-papers/adelphi-papers-2007/iran-under-ahmadinejad/?locale=en

[7] Ibid.